I’ve been following the ongoing debate over the encryption of over-the-air television signals for several years now. While most of that coverage has focused on the consumer experience, there’s also some pain in store for smaller independent broadcasters through the “High Noon” effort being imposed by the nation’s largest conglomerates.
I dive into that in my latest analysis piece.
“High Noon” is not some conspiracy theory – it’s the actual name for a plan about to be implemented by the nation’s largest broadcasters that mandates every station to purchase an encryption certificate through a private security authority called the A3SA. That authority, of course, is owned and operated by the nation’s largest broadcasters and has the power to revoke these certificates at will – essentially being able to pull those smaller stations off the air even if they have a valid FCC license.
These certificates are a requirement of the ATSC 3.0 standard even if the station doesn’t broadcast a DRM encrypted signal. And if that’s not all bad enough, the rules of how all of this work are locked behind an NDA so nobody can talk about it. And of course this private authority can change the rules anytime they want.
And how can they pull a station off the air? Well, the few tuners on the market that support DRM have to also support this signature authority. If the tuner doesn’t detect the certificate it won’t show the station to the viewer citing security issues.
The backdrop here is a filing from Weigel Broadcasting, one of the larger independent broadcasters with stations nationwide and a digital over the air network reaching most U.S. households. Unlike the big conglomerates, Weigel relies on actual viewers tuning in for ad revenue, so they’ve resisted DRM from the start. They’ve also been vocal in their opposition on the FCC docket, pointing out that DRM-compliant tuners are significantly more expensive than current ATSC 1.0 gear.
In tests, Weigel engineers confirmed that TVs are denied access to a channel when presented with unsigned signals, putting the A3SA effectively in the role of gatekeeper instead of the FCC.
“High Noon” was supposed to roll out on June 30, but broadcasters delayed its implementation in March. The reasons aren’t public, and under the NDA, people in the know can’t say why. I think pressure from independent stations and public opposition may be playing a role. Still, once that “High Noon” switch is flipped, broadcasters could find themselves in a position where their ability to reach viewers depends less on FCC licensing and more on private agreements with a handful of corporations.
The justification offered is security—protection against hijacking and what their industry association says are “deepfakes” of a broadcast. But history shows these incidents are exceptionally rare. The only real example of a hijack was the Max Headroom incident in Chicago in 1987, when someone overpowered a microwave relay and briefly took over a broadcast. More recent disruptions have been the result of poor security practices, like leaving default passwords on emergency alert systems or mistakes made inside the broadcast center by technicians. Encryption and signing certificates wouldn’t have prevented those.
Meanwhile, the consumer side of ATSC 3.0 remains sluggish. DRM has made tuners more expensive, stunting adoption of what otherwise could be a much more consumer-friendly standard. Independent broadcasters argue that the only way forward is to drop DRM entirely and allow viewers to access the public airwaves without interference which would bring down the cost of tuning devices substantially.
That’s where things stand now. The “High Noon” switch hasn’t been thrown yet, but the threat of it looms over the industry. For me, the question is whether the FCC will continue letting private groups usurp their authority, or if it will step in before viewers lose access to something they’ve always been entitled to receive.