Month: September 2025

The nation’s largest broadcasters are continuing to push an over the air encryption plan that will make it harder for people to record content or use gateway devices to watch TV around the house. What has been a free and open system is moving toward a locked-down approach unless the FCC steps in.

As it becomes clearer that encryption—and the market gatekeeping it enables—are holding back both tuning device availability and adoption, broadcasters are now demanding a government mandate to push it all through. But just a short time ago they were advocating for government to stay out of the process.

In my latest video, I take a look at how broadcasters are contradicting themselves in a recent FCC filing.

After Tyler the Antenna Man and I met with the FCC, the nation’s largest broadcasters quickly followed with their own meeting and filed an ex parte letter about it. In the letter, the broadcasters say:

“We emphasized that all parts of the broadcast ecosystem – from CE manufacturers to developers of converter boxes to retailers and smaller market broadcasters – are waiting for a signal from the FCC that there is a plan to bring the transition to ATSC 3.0 to an end.”

In a response, the Consumer Technology Association reminded the FCC in a meeting and a follow-up ex-parte filing that all parties to the transition, including the broadcasters, never wanted the government stepping in on the transition as it was supposed to be a voluntary, market-driven one. But the CTA stopped short of saying what is obvious—that DRM has been the real barrier to adoption.

But the CTA was joined by Public Knowledge in their meeting with the FCC, and that organization very strongly pointed out the pitfalls in allowing a select group of broadcasters to essentially regulate consumer electronic devices.

Check out my interview with Public Knowledge’s lead attorney here.

Looking back at their own public statements shows how much the broadcasters have shifted in their position. In 2019 Pearl TV, the organization comprised of the large broadcast owners, was promising great new technology and choice for consumers under this voluntary transition strategy. In 2021 they touted gateway devices like the HDHomeRun, even though they later denied that device certification. By mid 2023 they were boasting about adoption and asking a rhetorical question “where’s the problem?” in regards to tuner adoption. They urged the FCC to stay out of the market, but now they want a mandate to force adoption.

They even contradicted statements they made just a few weeks ago. In their letter they state:

“We discussed A3SA’s uniform set of policies that applies equally and objectively to all manufacturers of a particular device type. Finally, we explained that A3SA does not certify hardware components or chips within devices.”

Yet in July, these very same lawyers told the FCC that the HDHomeRun was being blocked because of its chips. They CC’d the industry press and just about every relevant department with it too.

Conversations I’ve had with broadcast executives suggest they don’t really understand the technology they’re trying to bolt onto broadcasting. Encryption designed for the web doesn’t translate cleanly to over-the-air TV. Yet they continue to dig in, convinced it’s necessary. Much of their industry today is built on retransmission fees rather than actual viewers, and DRM protects those business interests.

And this goes beyond just the encryption. Another feature, signal signing, gives this small group of large broadcasters the ability to take a channel off the air. Even stations that don’t want encryption still need to pay for a certificate from the major broadcasters just to appear on certified tuners. Engineers like Weigel’s Kyle Walker have raised these concerns, but the executives pushing this system seem more interested in invoking flawed analogies—like comparing broadcast encryption to SSL on websites—than in engaging with real technical risks. Here’s an example of that from a recent LinkedIn exchange from one of those executives:

The examples they cite don’t hold up. The 1987 Chicago “Max Headroom” hijacking and the more recent Russian satellite hijacks were both upstream feed compromises that encryption and signing would not have prevented. Yet they continue to argue that certificates protect against threats that have nothing to do with the broadcast signal itself.

For consumers, the result is fewer choices and fewer freedoms. Encryption blocks devices, limits how recordings can be made, and puts unnecessary restrictions on how people watch the signals they’re legally entitled to receive. The broadcasters are not tacitly acknowledging that this market has failed, but it’s their own system that created the failure.

If they really want adoption, there’s a simple solution: stop encrypting. Remove the DRM and devices will appear, consumers will buy them, and the market they keep talking about will actually materialize. Instead, they’re asking the FCC for a mandate to force this system into place. I think the better mandate would be the opposite—no encryption and no private regulation of public airwaves. That’s the kind of order I’d get behind.

I’ve been following the ongoing debate over the encryption of over-the-air television signals for several years now. While most of that coverage has focused on the consumer experience, there’s also some pain in store for smaller independent broadcasters through the “High Noon” effort being imposed by the nation’s largest conglomerates.

I dive into that in my latest analysis piece.

“High Noon” is not some conspiracy theory – it’s the actual name for a plan about to be implemented by the nation’s largest broadcasters that mandates every station to purchase an encryption certificate through a private security authority called the A3SA. That authority, of course, is owned and operated by the nation’s largest broadcasters and has the power to revoke these certificates at will – essentially being able to pull those smaller stations off the air even if they have a valid FCC license.

These certificates are a requirement of the ATSC 3.0 standard even if the station doesn’t broadcast a DRM encrypted signal. And if that’s not all bad enough, the rules of how all of this work are locked behind an NDA so nobody can talk about it. And of course this private authority can change the rules anytime they want.

And how can they pull a station off the air? Well, the few tuners on the market that support DRM have to also support this signature authority. If the tuner doesn’t detect the certificate it won’t show the station to the viewer citing security issues.

The backdrop here is a filing from Weigel Broadcasting, one of the larger independent broadcasters with stations nationwide and a digital over the air network reaching most U.S. households. Unlike the big conglomerates, Weigel relies on actual viewers tuning in for ad revenue, so they’ve resisted DRM from the start. They’ve also been vocal in their opposition on the FCC docket, pointing out that DRM-compliant tuners are significantly more expensive than current ATSC 1.0 gear.

In tests, Weigel engineers confirmed that TVs are denied access to a channel when presented with unsigned signals, putting the A3SA effectively in the role of gatekeeper instead of the FCC.

“High Noon” was supposed to roll out on June 30, but broadcasters delayed its implementation in March. The reasons aren’t public, and under the NDA, people in the know can’t say why. I think pressure from independent stations and public opposition may be playing a role. Still, once that “High Noon” switch is flipped, broadcasters could find themselves in a position where their ability to reach viewers depends less on FCC licensing and more on private agreements with a handful of corporations.

The justification offered is security—protection against hijacking and what their industry association says are “deepfakes” of a broadcast. But history shows these incidents are exceptionally rare. The only real example of a hijack was the Max Headroom incident in Chicago in 1987, when someone overpowered a microwave relay and briefly took over a broadcast. More recent disruptions have been the result of poor security practices, like leaving default passwords on emergency alert systems or mistakes made inside the broadcast center by technicians. Encryption and signing certificates wouldn’t have prevented those.

Meanwhile, the consumer side of ATSC 3.0 remains sluggish. DRM has made tuners more expensive, stunting adoption of what otherwise could be a much more consumer-friendly standard. Independent broadcasters argue that the only way forward is to drop DRM entirely and allow viewers to access the public airwaves without interference which would bring down the cost of tuning devices substantially.

That’s where things stand now. The “High Noon” switch hasn’t been thrown yet, but the threat of it looms over the industry. For me, the question is whether the FCC will continue letting private groups usurp their authority, or if it will step in before viewers lose access to something they’ve always been entitled to receive.