Our fight to stop the encryption of over-the-air television continues… The latest broadcast industry filings add a more specific concern to an already contentious transition. Broadcasters pushing DRM for ATSC 3.0 are now effectively acknowledging that emergency alerts can end up behind that encryption layer and will be inaccessible to those who do not purchase an industry blessed tuning box.
The issue surfaced after a filing highlighted that some boxes need an internet connection to decrypt over-the-air signals. If the internet connection is down, those devices may not receive emergency alerts carried on encrypted broadcasts. In response, the A3SA, the private group overseeing this content protection system, argued that nearly all ATSC 3.0 devices can play encrypted content without internet access, while also conceding that not all of them can. It framed the problem as a matter of device design rather than a flaw in the DRM system itself.
What stood out to me is that this distinction does little to ease the practical concern for viewers. If a household owns one of the boxes that does require connectivity, the result is the same: access to emergency information may depend on whether both the device and the internet connection are working properly. That is a different standard from the one many people associate with free broadcast television, which has long been valued in part because it remains available during outages and emergencies.
The filings also addressed two devices that have become central to this debate. One is the HDHomeRun, the most popular ATSC 3.0 tuner on the market that lets viewers watch television across multiple devices on a home network. It remains unable to decrypt protected content because the A3SA has refused to allow it to do so. The other is the ZapperBox, which can decrypt encrypted broadcasts but currently requires an internet connection. In its filing, A3SA called the ZapperBox an outlier and said it is working with the company on the issue.
To me, the HDHomeRun example helps explain why this debate has expanded beyond technical standards and into consumer access. The device is popular because it offers flexibility. Viewers can use it with screens they already own rather than being pushed toward a single approved box or television set. The refusal to extend decryption approval to that type of device has become, for critics, evidence that the system is narrowing consumer choice rather than modernizing it.
A follow-up filing pushed that point further. It noted that Sinclair, one of the companies involved in promoting ATSC 3.0, has directed viewers toward a box that itself requires internet access for decryption. It also cited a notice from KSAT in Texas warning viewers that currently available NextGen TV converter boxes “don’t seem to be reliable” and that station engineers had tested multiple versions without success. KSAT is owned by Graham Media, another supporter of the transition.
That admission is difficult to ignore. Years into what has been described as a market-driven rollout, the available converter hardware still appears limited, inconsistent, and in many cases unreliable. I myself have direct testing experience with all of these boxes, including a second-generation ADTH converter that at times still needed internet access to refresh certificates and at one point failed to decrypt signals during a blizzard despite being connected.
Another filing from Digital Alert Systems, a manufacturer of emergency alert equipment, appears to strengthen the central complaint. The company stated that emergency alert signals are embedded in the protected ATSC 3.0 stream. That means the alert is not simply riding alongside the encryption barrier; it is inside it. If the device cannot decrypt the stream, the alert may not get through.
Now compare this to a smartphone that can also now receive emergency alert messaging. A phone without active service can still receive emergency warnings so long as its internal cellular radio is functioning. But under the A3SA’s model, a television may not be able to deliver similar alerts unless the device is approved, functioning correctly, and in some cases online. That changes the role of broadcast television in a meaningful way. Broadcasters get use of public spectrum in exchange for providing service during emergencies. This breaks that covenant.
The list of available ATSC 3.0 devices reportedly shows that most set-top boxes do not support decryption without internet access. Options that do are limited, and one of the few cited models is currently out of stock due to component shortages. For televisions, the least expensive model capable of tuning encrypted content was said to cost around $580, with many others priced far higher. For viewers hoping to upgrade an older television with a simple low-cost converter, the choices remain thin and unreliable.
There is also a political dimension beginning to take shape. A recent letter to the FCC signed by dozens of members of Congress urged a faster transition to ATSC 3.0. I believe many of the lawmakers signing on may not yet understand how deeply encryption is shaping the rollout. If that is true, the next phase of this debate may depend on whether elected officials come to see DRM not as a technical footnote, but as a structural issue affecting access, affordability, and public safety.
Take a look at the list here, and if your congressperson is on it contact them!!
For now, the FCC has not issued a final decision, and the transition appears to be in a holding pattern. From where I sit, the broad promise of ATSC 3.0 remains tied up in a narrower fight over control: who gets to build devices, who gets to approve them, and under what conditions viewers can receive a signal that was once simply there and accessible to anyone with a tuner.